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Abstract
A natural way to relate the existence theorems of Reny (1999) and Simon
and Zame (1990) would be to show the following: Each game with an endoge-
nous sharing rule satisfying the assumptions of Simon and Zame (1990) is such
that the payo correspondence has a measurable selection inducing a normal-
form game whose mixed extension satises the assumptions in Reny (1999).
We present a result showing that this is not so in general, even not when the
assumptions in Reny (1999) are weakened to those in Barelli and Meneghel
(2013).
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1 Introduction
The approaches of Reny (1999) and of Simon and Zame (1990) both provide mixed
strategy equilibrium existence results for general discontinuous games. While the ap-
proach of Reny (1999) means to impose certain topological conditions on players' pay-
o functions in the mixed extension of a given normal form game|summarized by the
notion of \better reply security",|the approach of Simon and Zame (1990) replaces
the vector of players' payo function by a correspondence with certain properties|
upper hemicontinuous with nonempty, closed and convex values|and asks whether
there is some measurable selection such that the induced normal form game has a
mixed strategy equilibrium. As pointed out by Jackson and Swinkels (2005), in some
specic contexts such as auction settings, the two approaches seem to be closely re-
lated; however, as also pointed out by these authors, \[h]ow these approaches turn
out to be related ... is an open question".
In this note we address this question. We rst remark that Simon and Zame's
(1990) existence result cannot be used to establish the mixed strategy equilibrium
existence result of Reny (1999). Indeed, let (Xi; ui)i=1;:::;n be a normal form game such
that the action sets Xi are non-empty compact metric spaces and such that the mixed
extension satises Reny's condition of better reply security.1 Write X =
Qn
i=1Xi, and
u = (u1; : : : ; un). Then, if one takes for the payo correspondence Q : X ! Rn the
correspondence dened by setting Q(x) = fu(x)g for x 2 X, Simon and Zame's
(1990) existence result does not apply because this latter result requires Q to be
closed, which need not be true because better-reply security|regardless of whether
in mixed or in pure strategies|does not imply that u is continuous. If one takes for Q
the smallest upper hemi-continuous closed- and convex-valued correspondence which
includes u (in the sense of set inclusion of the graphs), then Simon and Zame's (1990)
1See Section 2 for a formal denition.
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existence result cannot be used either, just because this result does not control the
selection for which there is a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Conversely, with (Xi)i=1;:::n and X as above, let Q : X ! Rn be a payo corre-
spondence which is upper hemi-continuous with non-empty compact convex values.
Then, in order that Reny's (1999) existence result can be used to establish that of
Simon and Zame (1990), one would need the existence of a measurable selection of Q
that is better-reply secure in mixed strategies.
In this paper we show, however, that in a general game with an endogenous sharing
rule the payo correspondence need not have any measurable selection inducing a
normal form game whose mixed extension is better-reply secure. Our result thus
suggests that, in general, there is no formal relationship between the existence result
of Simon and Zame (1990) and the mixed strategy existence result of Reny (1999).
We also consider the notion of continuous security, which was introduced by Barelli
and Meneghel (2013). The mixed strategy version of this notion amounts to a con-
dition that is weaker than the mixed strategy version of better reply security (see
Barelli and Meneghel (2013, Proposition 2.4)). Nevertheless, a similar conclusion as
with better reply security is true. In fact, we show that the payo correspondence of
a game with an endogenous sharing rule need not have any measurable selection such
that the mixed extension of the induced normal form game is continuously secure.
Closing the introduction, we comment on a paper by Bich and Laraki (2017). For a
normal form game (Xi; ui)i=1;:::;n as above, and Q : X ! Rn the smallest upper hemi-
continuous closed- and convex-valued correspondence which includes u = (u1; : : : ; un),
Bich and Laraki (2017) showed (see their Remark 4.4) that the method of proof used in
Simon and Zame (1990) can be used to prove Reny's (1999) mixed strategy existence
result if the mixed extension of the original game (Xi; ui)i=1;:::;n is better reply secure.
This seems to be the largest extent to which one can relate the work of Simon and
Zame (1990) and Reny (1999); indeed, in line with our result, the hypothesis in the
existence results for discontinuous games by Reny (1999) and by Simon and Zame
(1990) are incomparable.
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2 The result
For our purposes, it suces to consider 2-player games where each player has the
closed unit interval [0; 1] as his action set. We write I = f0; 1g for the set of these
players. Given i 2 I, we write  i for I nfig. Also, we write M for the set of Borel
probability measures on [0; 1]. Thus M is the set of mixed strategies available for
each of the two players. We regard M as being endowed with the narrow topology,2
and M M with the corresponding product topology.
In the context specied in the previous paragraph, a normal form game is fully
determined by a bounded measurable function u = (u1; u2) : [0; 1] [0; 1]! R2, with
the interpretation that given x = (x1; x2) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1], the payo of player i is
ui(x), i = 1; 2.
Given a normal form game u : [0; 1] [0; 1]! R2, the mixed extension of u is the
function u = (u1; u2) : MM ! R2 dened by setting ui(1; 2) =
R
[0;1][0;1] uid12
for i = 1; 2 and (1; 2) 2 M M . Thus, given (1; 2) 2 M M , ui(1; 2) is the
expected payo of player i.
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game u is a pair (1; 2) 2M M such
that ui(i;  i)  ui(0i;  i) for each i 2 I and each 0i 2 M . Of course, this is
equivalent to saying that (1; 2) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the mixed
extension u of u.
Let u be a normal form game, with mixed extension u. We say that u is mixed-
strategy-better-reply secure if whenever (1; 2; r1; r2) 2 M M  R2 belongs to the
closure of the graph of u and (1; 2) is not a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of u,
there is an i 2 I, a number  > ri, a i 2M , and a neighborhood V of  i inM such
that ui(i; 
0
 i)   for all 0 i 2 V . In other words, this amounts to the requirement
that the mixed extension u of u be better-reply secure.
We say that u is mixed-strategy-continuously secure if whenever (1; 2) 2M M
is not a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, there is an  2 R2, a neighborhood V of
2Recall that the narrow topology onM is the coarsest topology onM making the map  7! R fd
continuous for every bounded continuous real-valued function f on [0; 1]. Furthermore, recall that
the Prohorov metric metricizes the narrow topology on M .
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(1; 2) in M M , and a closed nonempty-valued correspondence 'i : V ! M for
each i 2 I such that
(a) for any (01; 
0
2) 2 V and each i 2 N , 'i(01; 02)  fi 2M : ui(i; 0 i)  ig,
(b) for any (01; 
0
2) 2 V , there is an i 2 I such that 0i 62 cofi 2 M : ui(i; 0 i) 
ig.3
In other words, this amounts to the requirement that the mixed extension u of u be
continuously secure.
Given any bounded measurable function u : [0; 1]  [0; 1] ! R2, we write Qu for
the smallest convex-valued and closed correspondence Q : [0; 1]  [0; 1] ! R2 which
includes u in the sense of set inclusion of the graphs, i.e. Qu(x) = cofr 2 R2 : (x; r) 2
 ug for each x 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1], where  u denotes the closure of the graph of u and
co stands for \convex hull". We write SQu for the set of all measurable selections
of Qu. Note that boundedness of u implies that Qu must actually be upper hemi-
continuous with compact values; in particular, every element of SQu must be bounded
and therefore denes a normal form game in the sense of the above specications.
Here is our result; recall that, as noted in the introduction, mixed-strategy-better-
reply security implies mixed-strategy-continuous security.
Theorem. There is a bounded measurable function u : [0; 1] [0; 1]! R2 such that
no u 2 SQu is mixed-strategy-continuously secure; in particular, no u 2 SQu is
mixed-strategy-better-reply secure.
The proof of the theorem is in the next section, which also contains some intuition
for it.
3This denition of continuous security is as in Barelli and Meneghel (2013) but it is not a sucient
condition for the existence of equilibrium. To solve this problem, one can require 'i to be convex, as
in Barelli and Soza (2009), or to be included in a nite-dimensional subspace ofM , as in McLennan,
Monteiro, and Tourky (2011).
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3 Proof of the theorem
In the sequel, \equilibrium" means \mixed strategy Nash equilibrium." For each
i 2 N and each xi 2 [0; 1], we write xi for the Dirac measure at xi. Also, we write
X = [0; 1] [0; 1]. Let
S1 = [2=3; 1] [0; 1=2]:
Let A denote the set of even natural numbers that are greater or equal than 6, and
for each n 2 A, let
Sn2 =

(x1; x2) 2 X : x1 2

1
n+ 1
;
1
n

and x1  x2  2x1

:
Let S2 =
S
n2A S
n
2 . Dene u
 = (u1; u

2) : X ! R2 by setting
u(x1; x2) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(1; 1) if (x1; x2) 2 S1
(2; 2) if (x1; x2) 2 S2
(0; 0) if (x1; x2) 2 Xn(S1 [ S2):
Note that Qu(0; 0) = f(2; 2) :  2 [0; 1]g, Qu(1; 1) = Qu(0; 1) = f(0; 0)g, and
Qu(1; 0) = f(1; 1)g.
Fix any u 2 SQu and recall that u denotes the mixed extension of u.
To see that u is not mixed-strategy-continuously secure, assume rst that u is such
that (0; 1) is an equilibrium of u. Because u(0; 1) = (0; 0) and u(0; 0) = (2; 2)
for some  2 [0; 1], it follows that u(0; 0) = (0; 0). Since u(1; 0) = (1; 1), it follows
that (0; 0) is not a equilibrium of u. Suppose that u is mixed-strategy-continuously
secure. Then, in particular, there is an  2 R2, an open neighborhood V  M M
of (0; 0), and nonempty-valued closed correspondences 'i : V ! Xi for each i 2 I,
such that conditions (a) and (b) in the denition of continuous security hold. Let
(x01; x
0
2) 2 X be such that (x01 ; x02) 2 V , x01 < x02 < 2x01 and x01 2 (1=(n+ 1); 1=n) for
some n 2 A. Then x0 belongs to the interior of Sn2 , so u(x0) = (2; 2). Condition (b) in
the denition of mixed-strategy-continuous security therefore implies that i > 2 for
some i 2 I. This, however, implies that condition (a) in the denition of continuous
security cannot hold because ui(x^i; x
0
 i)  2 for all x^i 2 [0; 1] and all i 2 I. This
contradiction shows that u is not mixed-strategy-continuously secure.
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Now assume that u is such that (0; 1) is not an equilibrium of u. Again suppose
that u is continuously secure. Then there exists  2 R2, an open neighborhood
V  M M of (0; 1), and closed nonempty-valued correspondences 'i : V ! Mi
for each i 2 I, such that conditions (a) and (b) in the denition of continuous security
hold. Let x0 2 X be such that (x01 ; x02) 2 V , x01 2 (1=(n+1); 1=n) for some odd n  6
(i.e. n 2 Ac), and x02 > 1=2. Then u1(y1; x02) = 0 for all y1 2 [0; 1] and u2(x01; y2) = 0
for all y2 2 [0; 1]. This, together with condition (a) in the denition of continuous
security, implies that i  0 for each i 2 I. But then fi 2M : ui(i; x0 i)  ig =M
for each i 2 I, and condition (b) in the denition of continuous security fails. This
contradiction shows that u is not mixed-strategy-continuously secure also if (0; 1) is
not an equilibrium of u.
We conclude this section by noting that a simpler example would suce to show
that no u 2 SQu is mixed-strategy-better-reply secure. Specically, modify the
functions u by changing the denition of the set S2 to
S2 = f(x1; x2) 2 X : x1  1=4 and x1  x2  2x1g:
Some intuition is now as follows. Saying that there is no u 2 SQu which is
mixed-strategy-better-reply secure is the same as saying that neither u is mixed-
strategy-better-reply-secure, nor can u be changed at its points of discontinuity to
obtain a u which is mixed-strategy-better-reply-secure. Perhaps the easiest way to
see that u is not mixed-strategy-better-reply-secure is to consider (0; 1) which is
not an equilibrium of u (since u2(0; 1) = 0 < 2 = u

2(0; 0)). The vector (0; 1; 0; 0)
belongs to the graph of the mixed extension of u, but no player can secure a payo
strictly above 0 at (0; 1). The same argument holds for any u 2 SQu provided that
(0; 1) is not an equilibrium of u. This property can fail but only if u2(0; 0) = 0; this,
in turn, implies that u1(0; 0) = 0 (as u1 = u2) and that (0; 0) is not an equilibrium
of u (as u1(1; 0) = 1). Since (0; 0; 2; 2) belongs to the closure of the graph of the
mixed extension of u and the payo of each player is bounded above by 2, no player
can secure a payo strictly above 2 at (0; 0).
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